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Hunger Strikes at Guantanamo — Medical Ethics and Human
Rights in a “Legal Black Hole”
George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.
Being Human, a collection of readings assembled
by President George W. Bush’s Council on Bioethics, contains a powerful description of the
force-feeding of Soviet political prisoner Vladimir Bukovsky, who was on a hunger strike to protest the refusal of prison authorities to provide
a lawyer for a fellow inmate who was awaiting
trial:

gency restraint chair.” The chair is described by
its inventor, a former sheriff whose jailer had
been injured by a prisoner, as a “padded cell on
wheels.”4 His company has shipped 25 such chairs
to Guantanamo. The prisoner can be strapped
into one of them in six-point restraints, including not just the hands and feet, but also the head
and torso, and safely transported to a medical
care facility. The chair was not designed for either
They started feeding me forcibly through
treatment or punishment. Nonetheless, at Guanthe nostril. By a rather thick rubber tube
tanamo, beginning in early 2006, these chairs
with a metal end on it. . . . The procedure
were being used to immobilize prisoners on hunwill be that four or five KGB guys will come
ger strikes and force-feed them. And it succeeded.
to my cell, take me to a medical unit, put a
As of February 22, 2006, reportedly only three destraitjacket on me, tie me up to a table, and
tainees were still being force-fed in the restraint
somebody will be still holding, even so I
chairs, and in June 2006 that number remained
was tied down, holding my shoulders and
the same.3
head and legs, and one will be pushing this
The medical records of the Guantanamo pristhing through my nostril. . . . It’s painful
oners who have been force-fed in the restraint
like hell I must tell you, because for some
chairs, some of which have been introduced into
reason nose is very sensitive part of body
evidence in pending lawsuits to enjoin further
and the tears will be filling your eyes and
use of the chairs, contain what appears to be a
sort of streaming down because it’s so painpreprinted “medical officer note” that is in many
ful, and — awful thing.1
ways as chilling as Bukovsky’s description of his
own force-feeding, especially because it reflects
This procedure was repeated daily for 12 days. the detached clinical viewpoint of the physicians
Any participation by physicians in this force- instead of the viewpoint of the prisoner:
feeding in the prison’s “medical unit” would almost certainly have been condemned by the CounDespite being advised that hunger striking
cil on Bioethics. Of course, it is easy to condemn
is detrimental to his health, the detainee
the brutal actions of Soviet-era jailers against porefuses to eat. Restraints were ordered for
litical dissidents. It is much more difficult to admedical necessity to facilitate feeding the dedress the acts of our own country, especially acts,
tainee. There is no evidence that medicadifferent only in the degree, that have been used
tions or a medical process is causing this
by U.S. military physicians against hunger strikdetainee’s refusal to eat. Detainee does not
ers at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.2,3
have any medical condition/disability that
On September 11, 2005, 131 prisoners at Guanwould place him at greater risk during feedtanamo were on hunger strikes. At the end of
ing using medical restraints. Detainee was
told that he will remain in restraints until
2005, that number was 84.2 In January 2006, a
feed and postfeed observation time (60–120
new technique was introduced in the prison camp
minutes) is completed. Detainee underto break the hunger strike: the use of an “emer-
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stands that if he eats, that involuntary feeding
in medical restraints will no longer be required.
GITMO Dr. ______________
The medical records of 20-year-old Guantanamo prisoner Yousif Al-Shehri, for example, contain this identical entry twice a day for 8 consecutive days from January 18 to January 25, 2006,
after which his records indicate that he ended
his hunger strike and became “compliant.” The
name of the physician who signed the orders has
been redacted.
Force-feeding by physicians of competent prisoners on hunger strikes is widely condemned as
being both illegal and unethical.5 But some controversies persist, most of which are related to
the assessment of the prisoner’s competence and
motivation, as well as the probable effect of a successful hunger strike on prison security.
The Guantanamo Hunger Strikes

Various types of hunger strikes have been occurring at Guantanamo almost since it became an
interrogation center for terrorist suspects in early 2002.6 As many as 200 prisoners have been on
hunger strikes at once, and there were probably
about 100 on hunger strikes in November 2005,
when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was
asked, “Do you approve of the force-feeding of
detainees [at Guantanamo] who are on hunger
strike?” He replied, “I’m not a doctor and I’m not
the kind of a person who would be in a position
to approve or disapprove. . . . The responsible
people are the combatant commanders.”7 In short,
the policy of the Department of Defense is that
the decision whether or not to force-feed a prisoner at Guantanamo is a military one to be made
by the base commander; the decision about how
to actually force-feed a prisoner is a medical one
to be made by military physicians.
The use of physicians to aggressively break a
prison hunger strike raises complex medical ethics and legal issues that have been the subject of
international debate for decades. U.S. courts have
occasionally been asked to rule on the legality of
force-feeding prisoners, and they have usually permitted it if done by a physician in a medically reasonable manner for the primary purpose of either
preventing suicide or maintaining order in the
prison.8-12 I have written about hunger strikes
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a number of times and in 1982 concluded, “We
restrict the rights of prisoners in many ways.
Force-feeding them rather than permitting them
to starve themselves to death is probably one of
the most benign.”12 This is also the position the
Department of Defense takes on the Guantanamo hunger strikes. As the most senior civilian
physician in the Pentagon, William Winkenwerder,
Jr., said in response to questions about breaking
the most recent Guantanamo hunger strike, “There
is a moral question. Do you allow a person to commit suicide? Or do you take steps to protect their
health and preserve their life?”2,13
But both my 1982 position and Winkenwerder’s 2006 position seem overly simplistic
and mechanistic in the context of Guantanamo,
and I grossly underestimated the pain and medical complications force-feeding can impose on a
competent prisoner. Physicians must answer three
related questions to determine their legal and ethical obligations to hunger strikers in prison: Is
the prisoner on a hunger strike? When is it ethical for a physician to force-feed a hunger striker?
And what means can be used by a physician to
force-feed a hunger striker?
What Is a Hunger Strike?

Hunger strikes in prison are dangerous for both
prisoners and jailers, but they are often the only
way, or the last resort, for prisoners to protest the
conditions of their confinement. Hunger strikes
in prison can result in death when the government refuses to either negotiate or force-feed; this
happened to members of the Irish Republican
Army who went on a hunger strike in the Maze
Prison in the early 1980s and to hunger strikers in
Turkish prisons in 1996 and from 2000 to 2003.14
Hernan Reyes of the International Committee
of the Red Cross has written the most authoritative article on hunger strikes, which he also terms
“voluntary total fasting.”15 According to Reyes,
fasting, voluntariness, and a stated purpose are
all needed before a prisoner can be said to be on
a hunger strike. Simply refusing to eat as a reaction to a specific situation, whether in frustration
or anger, for example, does not qualify as a hunger strike. Thus, the initial rounds of fasting at
Guantanamo in early 2002 in response to specific
actions of the guards toward individual prisoners do not count.6 Nor do prisoners who refuse
to eat as a result of severe depression or other
mental illness, and with no goal in mind other
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than their own death, qualify as legitimate hunger strikers.
The determination to fast until either political demands are met or death occurs may vary
from person to person. This is especially true when
fasting occurs in groups, since members of the
group may be less free to break the fast; peer
pressure must be taken into account by physicians when deciding whether prisoner-patient is
voluntarily continuing to refuse food.14,15 The determination of the hunger striker will also suggest the likely medical consequences of continuing the hunger strike. Most hunger strikers, for
example, have taken some water, salt, sugar, and
vitamin B1 at least for a time before asserting an
intention to fast to death.14 Physicians should inform hunger strikers that intake of these nutrients considerably decreases the chances of permanent disability should the strike end before
death (which is never the desired end point of a
true hunger striker).
In its Declaration of Tokyo, the World Medical Association ruled out physician participation
in the force-feeding of prisoners. Nonetheless,
its more specific Declaration of Malta (Declaration on Hunger Strikers) permits physicians to
attend to a prison hunger striker in the context
of a traditional physician–patient relationship if
consent and confidentiality can be maintained.
As compared with the International Committee
of the Red Cross’s definition, the World Medical
Association’s definition of a hunger striker is
much broader in that it does not require a specific goal: “A hunger striker is a mentally competent person who has indicated that he has decided to embark on a hunger strike and has
refused to take food and/or fluids for a significant interval.”16
Should Physicians Participate in ForceFeeding Hunger Strikers at Guantanamo?

It is a violation of medical ethics for military
physicians to treat competent patients against
their will solely for military or political purposes
or for punishment. The Department of Defense
seems to understand this, and so it has publicly
relied on two basic rationales for ordering military physicians to force-feed prisoners: it is in
the best medical interest of prisoners, and it is
done in accordance with regulations issued by
the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Prisons regarding hunger strikes in federal prisons.13

n engl j med 355;13

Both arguments seem reasonable, but neither
fits the facts at Guantanamo. The first — that
force-feeding is in the best medical interests of
prisoners — is acceptable if it applies only to
prisoners who are not actually on hunger strikes
(as defined by the International Committee of
the Red Cross), but rather have stopped eating
because of a mental illness such as depression
and can reasonably be declared incompetent to
refuse treatment, including force-feeding, if and
when such feeding is necessary to sustain their
lives or health. So to the extent that an individual competency assessment has been properly
conducted and the prisoner is found to fit into
this category, force-feeding is medically indicated. This category is not likely to apply to many
prisoners at Guantanamo, however. As Major
General Jay W. Hood, the camp’s commander,
told a group of visiting physicians in the fall of
2005, the prisoners at Guantanamo are protesting their confinement; they are not suicidal.17
The second argument — that force-feeding is
in accordance with regulations by the Bureau of
Prisons regarding hunger strikes — requires a
closer examination of these regulations.18 They
are triggered when the person on a hunger strike
“communicates that fact to staff and is observed
by staff to be refraining from eating for a period
of time, ordinarily in excess of 72 hours.” On
referral for medical evaluation, the inmate shall
undergo a medical and psychiatric examination
and be placed “in a medically appropriate locked
room for close monitoring” (if necessary to accurately measure food and fluid intake and output). There, his or her weight and vital signs are
to be checked at least every 24 hours.18 If and
when the physician determines “that the inmate’s
life or health will be threatened if treatment is
not initiated immediately,” the physician shall
make “reasonable efforts to convince the inmate
to voluntarily accept treatment,” including explaining the risks of refusing, and shall document these efforts. After such efforts (or in an
emergency), if “a medical necessity for immediate treatment of a life- or health-threatening situation exists, the physician may order that treatment be administered without the consent of
the inmate.”18
Whether or not one thinks these are reasonable regulations, only a physician (not the warden) is permitted to make treatment decisions
on the basis of them, and then only after rea-
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sonable attempts to obtain voluntary compliance.
To the extent that military commanders are making the decisions about force-feeding, the rules
of the Bureau of Prisons are not being followed
at Guantanamo. This may be why the immediate
past commander of the medical group responsible
for prisoner health care, Navy Captain John S. Edmondson, said that military health care personnel
are screened before they are deployed to Guantanamo “to ensure that they do not have ethical
objections to assisted feeding.”17 In addition, according to the rules of the Bureau of Prisons, 72
hours of fasting triggers a medical evaluation —
it does not trigger emergency force-feeding, which
generally occurs after weeks, if not months, of
continuous fasting.18
U.S. courts have generally upheld actions like
those authorized by the Bureau of Prisons at least
as long as the actual force-feeding (misleadingly
described as “assisted feeding”) is performed by
a physician in accordance with good and accepted medical procedures and the prisoner is either
suicidal or the treatment refusal presents a considerable security problem for the entire prison.
In terms of U.S. constitutional law, competent
prisoners have a right to refuse treatment, but
prison officials may overrule it when they have a
“legitimate penological interest,” which includes
preventing suicide among prisoners and maintaining order in the prison itself.19 Of course,
the major difference is that federal prisoners have
access to lawyers, U.S. courts, and independent
physicians to challenge treatments they believe
are abusive.
Medical Means to Force-Feed Hunger Strikers

The much more complex question concerning
medical ethics is what a physician should do after a competent hunger striker becomes incompetent and it reasonably appears that he or she
will die or sustain permanent injury without food,
and there is no reasonable possibility that his or
her demands will be met. Two positions have been
articulated, neither of which is terribly persuasive.
The World Medical Association holds that “when
the hunger striker has become confused and is
therefore unable to make an unimpaired decision
or has lapsed into a coma, the doctor shall be free
to make the decision for his patient as to further
treatment which he considers to be in the best interest of that patient.”16 The World Medical Association nonetheless requires the physician to hon-
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or the patient-prisoner’s previous decision to fast
to the death unless the physician has informed
the prisoner of his or her inability to honor this
wish and can engage another attending physician for the prisoner.16 The Declaration of Malta
has been described as “wholly inadequate” because of the discretion it allows physicians.20
As compared with the World Medical Association’s statement, the position of the Royal Dutch
Medical Association, drafted in response to hunger strikes by Vietnamese asylum seekers, is more
specific and less ambiguous. It suggests that hunger strikers should have access to a “doctor of
confidence” who will act as their physician and
keep them fully informed of the medical consequences of the hunger strike, but also follow their
wishes of nontreatment in case they become incompetent or comatose.21 To reduce uncertainty
in the case of incompetence, the Dutch guidelines call for hunger strikers to sign a specific
“statement of nonintervention” (similar to a living
will) that directs their care and rules out artificial or forced feeding. This written statement is
not to be made public unless and until the prisoner-patient actually becomes incompetent. Of
course, it would be nice if all prisoners had access to independent physicians, whether they are
called doctors of confidence or not. The major
problem at Guantanamo, however, is precisely that
the only physicians any prisoner has access to are
the military physicians at the base. Moreover, the
solution of a living will is no solution at all, since
it suggests that the prisoner might have made
confidential arrangements with the physician to
“save” him or her before he or she dies or suffers
serious harm, and so undercuts the power of the
hunger strike itself.22,23
U.S. military officials have said that they will
not permit anyone at Guantanamo to “fast to
death” because of the likely consequences concerning international propaganda, which could
pose a global security risk. Since the first three
suicides by hanging at Guantanamo in June 2006,
however, this rationale is less persuasive. All
three of these prisoners had been hunger strikers
at one time or another, and at least one of them,
Ali Abdullah Ahmed, had been repeatedly subjected to the emergency restraint chair. Dr. Winkenwerder’s position that the military can rewrite the Declaration of Malta to permit earlier
intervention because it “only makes good sense”
to force-feed hunger strikers before they become
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incompetent or are “near death” is also not persuasive.24
Prevention of the deaths of incompetent prisoners is a laudable medical goal. The use of emergency restraint chairs for force-feeding, however,
can never be ethically, legally, or medically justified — even in the case of an incompetent suicidal prisoner whose competence was determined
by a qualified psychiatrist. A prisoner who needs
to be forcibly restrained in this device for forcefeeding is almost certainly strong enough to be
in little or no health danger from continuing a
fast. The primary justification for the use of this
device for force-feeding seems to be punishment
rather than medical care.2,3 The use of any medical intervention as punishment is prohibited by
all relevant international treaties, principles of
medical ethics, and U.S. constitutional law.25,26
The restraint chair is the functional equivalent of
the Soviet straitjacket. Use of the restraint chair
for “postfeed observation” during which the prisoner must urinate and defecate on himself or herself seems designed more for humiliation and
subjugation than for medical treatment.
Medical Ethics at Guantanamo

There seems to be real tension between the physicians at Guantanamo, most of whom are under
the command of the Navy at the hospital, and
the Army commanders who are in charge of the
prisoners and their interrogations. It is often argued that a physician in the military should rarely
have to decide whether to be a military officer first
and a physician second or a physician first and
a military officer second.27 At Guantanamo, however, the choice is stark. Military physicians cannot follow military orders to force-feed competent
prisoners without violating basic precepts of medical ethics never to harm them by means of their
medical knowledge. New medical instructions
from the Department of Defense, dated June 6,
2006, acknowledge that involuntary treatment
should be preceded by “a thorough medical and
mental health evaluation of the detainee and
counseling concerning the risks of refusing treatment” and that any treatment should be “carried
out in a medically appropriate manner.” These instructions would rule out the use of emergency
restraint chairs, but nonetheless continue to permit force-feeding of mentally competent prisoners.13,24
Guantanamo has been called a “gulag,” an
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“anomaly,” “the legal equivalent of outer space,”
and a “legal black hole.” The Supreme Court ruled
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in June 2006 that the Geneva
Conventions have full force in Guantanamo as a
matter of both U.S. and international law.28 This
ruling reversed the Bush Administration’s policy
on Guantanamo and has been widely hailed, especially by military lawyers. The Court also ruled
that Geneva’s Common Article 3 applies to all
prisoners in custody. This article not only bans
the use of tribunals that are not “regularly constituted” (the issue in Hamdan), but also requires
all prisoners to be “treated humanely” and explicitly prohibits “cruel treatment and torture” as
well as “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.”
Four of the justices also ruled that the protocols
to the Geneva Conventions, although not ratified
by the United States, are binding international
laws. This is important, since the protocols specifically prohibit interference with actions by physicians that are consistent with medical ethics.
Treatment of incompetent hunger strikers in prison remains complex. Use of the restraint chairs
to break a hunger strike by a competent prisoner,
however, is a violation of both medical ethics and
of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which after Hamdan all Department of Defense personnel have been ordered to follow.29
Force-feeding at Guantanamo and the Hamdan
opinion provide the opportunity for the U.S. military to adopt as formal military doctrine the rule
that a physician in the military is always a physician first and a military officer second. They also
provide the President’s Council on Bioethics with
an opportunity to take a position on one of the
most important international bioethics issues of
our day. American military physicians always have
the obligation to disobey an unlawful order and
the option to disobey an order that is contrary
to medical ethics, but the “physician first” doctrine
would make it much less likely that any such orders would be issued in the first place.
No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.
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